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We compute the potential economic beneﬁts that would accrue to a typical
pre-WWII era US worker from the post-WWII macroeconomic policy regime.
We assume that workers face undiversiﬁable income risk but can self-insure
by saving in nominal assets. The worker’s average utility is computed for
two eras: pre-WWII (1875-1941) and post-WWII. In the pre-WWII era,
the worker endured business cycles that were large in amplitude and quite
volatile, a procyclical aggregate price level with large cyclical amplitude, a
high average unemployment rate, and virtually no trend in the aggregate
price level. In the post-WWII era, the same worker would have encountered
business cycles with smaller amplitude and less volatility, a countercyclical
aggregate price level with small cyclical amplitude, a much lower mean unem-
ployment rate, and a positive trend in the aggregate price level. Depending
on what is assumed about the eﬀects of macroeconomic policies on the mean
and variance of the unemployment rate, the potential gain in the worker’s
welfare ranges between −0.9 (if policies aﬀected the inﬂation rate but not
the mean or variance of the aggregate unemployment rate) to 4.19 percent
of consumption (if policies aﬀected the inﬂation rate and lowered the mean
and variance of the aggregate unemployment rate).1 Introduction
In this paper we assess the gain in welfare resulting from changes in the
character of US business cycles between the pre- and post-WWII eras. The
question we ask is: what fraction of consumption would a typical US indus-
trial worker from the pre-WWII era give up (in perpetuity) to live under the
post-WWII stochastic processes for de-trended income and price level? Our
welfare calculation is in the spirit of Lucas’s (1987) calculation of the wel-
fare cost of business cycles in that our intent is to obtain an estimate of the
welfare gains resulting from the change in the macroeconomic policy regime
between the pre- and post-WWII eras.
That there was a major change in macroeconomic policy regime between
the pre-WWII era (deﬁned in this paper as the period 1875-1941) and the
post-WWII period has been documented by economic historians (Temin
(1989)). In the pre-WWII era, macroeconomic policies in the US and other
European countries were aimed primarily at maintaining the external value
of domestic currency, deﬁned as the amount of gold a unit of currency could
purchase. The governments of countries participating in this “gold standard
regime” were required to maintain convertibility between their domestic cur-
rency and gold at some ﬁxed exchange rate. Since the ability to maintain
convertibility depended crucially on the government’s having adequate re-
serves of gold, protecting gold reserves took precedence over other macroeco-
nomic objectives. Indeed, there are many instances in US monetary history
where the concern with maintaining parity with gold determined key policy
actions.
1In contrast, the focus of macroeconomic policies in the post-WWII era has
been on domestic, as opposed to external, stability.1 In the United States,
this focus on domestic stability manifested itself in three broad classes of
aggregative policies: (i) automatic stabilizers that shored up aggregate de-
mand during cyclical downturns (income maintenance programs such as un-
employment insurance and progressive income taxation), (ii) policies aimed
at averting ﬁnancial crises (such as insurance of bank deposits and the Federal
Reserve’s activities as lender of last resort), and (iii) discretionary aggregate
demand management policies (such as countercyclical monetary and ﬁscal
actions). The ﬁrst two classes of policies were instituted during the Depres-
sion years, and the authority to undertake the third was written into the Full
Employment Act of 1946.
The question addressed in this paper is: what diﬀerence did this change in
regime make to the typical US industrial worker? Ideally, this question would
be answered by constructing a model in which the change in macroeconomic
policy arrangement is explicitly modelled and its ramiﬁcations for economic
welfare (and other operating characteristics of the economy) worked out.
Instead, we take a more elementary approach. We use a simple model of
consumer behavior to “identify” changes in key operating characteristics of
the US economy between the two eras and ask how these changes aﬀected
economic welfare of a typical worker. Obviously, the changes in operating
1Although the post-WWII period started out with an international monetary arrange-
ment of ﬁxed exchange rates (the Bretton Woods Agreement), the agreement failed to
stand the test of time. Indeed, scholars have argued that the arrangement was ﬂawed
from the beginning because of the unwillingness of US oﬃcials to accept provisions that
entailed sacriﬁcing domestic interests in favor of international stability.
2characteristics we identify reﬂect, in part, factors unrelated to changes in the
policy regime. So, the welfare eﬀects we report cannot all be attributed to
changes in the policy regime. To minimize this ambiguity we do our welfare
calculations in several steps, starting with changes we are conﬁdent reﬂect a
change in the policy regime, then proceeding to analyze the eﬀects of changes
that we are less conﬁdent were caused by the change in policy regime.
The model of consumer behavior we use is a variant of the model stud-
ied by Imrohoroglu (1989). The model abstracts from economic growth and
assumes that each individual faces an idiosyncratic risk of unemployment
against which insurance is not possible. Importantly, the probability of em-
ployment and the level of real earnings when employed are lower when eco-
nomic activity is cyclically low, and they are both higher when economic
activity is cyclically high. As a precaution against these ﬂuctuations in in-
come (due both to ﬂuctuations in employment status and in earnings when
employed), agents self-insure through the holding of money. Because indi-
viduals save in nominal assets, the cyclical and secular behavior of the price
level is important to the consumer. Thus, in this model of consumer behav-
ior, the two stochastic processes that matter for individual welfare are the
ones for (de-trended) income and for the level of consumer prices.
Brieﬂy, our ﬁndings are as follows. In the pre-WWII era, a typical indus-
trial worker endured business cycles that were large in amplitude and quite
volatile, a procyclical aggregate price level with large cyclical amplitude, a
high unemployment rate on average, and virtually no trend in the aggregate
price level. In the post-WWII era, industrial workers encountered business
cycles with smaller amplitude and less volatility, a countercyclical aggregate
3price level with small cyclical amplitude, a much lower unemployment rate
on average, and a positive trend in the aggregate price level. When we
confront the pre-WWII individual with stochastic processes for income and
prices from the post-WWII era, we ﬁnd that the individual is willing to pay
4.19 percent of his consumption in perpetuity to live under the new regime.
In what ways did the change in macroeconomic policy regime contribute
to this overall gain in welfare? First, we assume that the post-WWII policy
regime was a key factor in the post-WWII inﬂation rate. This is consistent
with the view that the post-WWII policy regime gave US policymakers dis-
cretion in setting domestic monetary policy. We estimate the welfare loss
from post-WWII inﬂation to be 0.9 percent of consumption (in perpetuity).
Second, we assume that the shift in policy regime had some role in reduc-
ing the volatility in real economic activity. Given the importance attached to
domestic stability by the post-WWII regime, this would seem a reasonable
assumption. It is generally accepted that volatility in real economic activ-
ity (real GNP, consumer expenditures, the unemployment rate, etc.) was
higher during the pre-WWII period as compared to the post-WWII period
(Zarnowitz (1992)). Although many factors contributed to this change, it
seems reasonable to assume that some of that reduction happened because
of policies such as automatic stabilizers and the Fed’s lender-of-last-resort ac-
tivities. We estimate the gain in welfare from this source to be 0.13 percent
of consumption (in perpetuity).
Third, we assume that the shift in policy regime may have lowered the
average unemployment rate in the post-WWII period. If the post-WWII
policy regime “ﬁlled in business cycle troughs without shaving oﬀ business
4cycle peaks” (to quote a phrase used by DeLong and Summers (1988)), then
it may have contributed to a lower average unemployment rate. Although
such an outcome is possible, there is much less consensus on this issue than
on the proposition that policies reduced cyclical volatility. We estimate the
potential gain in welfare from this source to be 4.61 percent of consumption
(in perpetuity).2
Our study adds a historical perspective to the literature on the welfare
cost of business cycles. Lucas’s original calculation, which focused on the
welfare gain from the elimination of all cyclical volatility in postwar aggre-
gate consumer spending, suggested that the representative consumer with a
relative risk aversion parameter of 1 would be willing to pay 0.008 percent of
average consumption in perpetuity to get rid of business cycles. Imrohoroglu
(1989) recalculated the welfare gain under the assumption that individuals
faced uninsurable unemployment risk and found that an individual with a
relative risk aversion parameter of 1.5 would be willing to pay 0.3 percent
of his average consumption in perpetuity to get rid of business cycles. Since
then, Atkeson and Phelan (1994) and Krusell and Smith (forthcoming) have
noted that Imrohoroglu’s results depend on how the elimination of business
cycles is assumed to aﬀect the probability of unemployment at the level of
the individual worker. If the elimination of business cycles merely removes
the correlation between changes in employment status of diﬀerent workers,
the gain in welfare will be nonexistent or very small.3 In contrast to these
2We do not evaluate the welfare eﬀects of the mean growth rate of consumption between
the two eras.
3Atkeson and Phelan provide an ingenious model in support of their contention that
stabilization policies may merely remove the correlation between changes in employment
5studies, our calculations are based on actual changes in cyclical volatility
between the pre- and post-WWII eras.4 To that extent, they are subject
to less ambiguity than the ones performed by Imrohoroglu and Krusell and
Smith.
Nevertheless, the ambiguities stressed by Atkeson and Phelan and Krusell
and Smith resurface when we attempt to relate the changes in the business
cycle environment (i.e., changes in means as well as volatility) to the changes
in macroeconomic policies between the two eras. Indeed, one of the lessons
of our study is that changes in the mean unemployment rate and the mean
duration of unemployment spells (in good and bad times) are the two factors
that an individual worker cares most about. If there are good reasons to
think that macroeconomic policies pursued in the post-WWII era did not
aﬀect these aspects of the worker’s environment (i.e., the declines in the
mean unemployment rate and the mean duration of unemployment spells
that did occur in the post-WWII period happened for reasons unrelated
to macroeconomic policies), then macroeconomic policies probably had a
negative eﬀect on individual welfare.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a brief description
of the pre-WWII macroeconomic policy regime and its likely implications
for the volatility of economic activity. Section 3 describes the economic
environment we study. Section 4 contains the calibration of the model to the
status of workers. Krusell and Smith assume this is so and focus on welfare consequences
of the general equilibrium price eﬀects of elimination of aggregate variability.
4Our ﬁnding that changes in cyclical environment contributed a 0.8 percent gain in
welfare assumes a risk aversion parameter of 1.5 and is thus comparable to Imrohorglu’s
ﬁnding of a 0.3 percent gain in welfare.
6pre- and post-WWII macroeconomic environments. Section 5 contains the
key ﬁndings and section 6 concludes.
2 The Pre-WWII Macro Policy Regime
Scholars who have studied the operation of the pre-WWII “gold standard
regime” agree that the regime tended to subordinate the health of a country’s
domestic economy to that of maintaining its currency’s parity with gold. For
instance, if a fall in commodity prices reduced export earnings for some
country and began a drain on its gold reserves, the policy response was
likely to be an increase in domestic interest rates. The rise in interest rates
attracted foreign capital and, at the same time, reduced domestic aggregate
demand and, hence, imports. Both eﬀects worked to oﬀset the initial decline
in gold reserves, but by causing a decline in domestic aggregate demand,
the policy aggravated the decline in income and employment caused by the
initial decline in export earnings. On the positive side, adherence to the
gold standard regime ensured that a country did not suﬀer from persistent
inﬂation. A sustained rise in domestic prices was impossible because it led
eventually to an adverse trade balance and a decline in gold reserves. Once
reserves began declining, interest rates rose — which served to slow the growth
in domestic money, credit, and prices.
The vulnerability of the domestic economy to adverse foreign-sector shocks
was, arguably, greater for the US than for other countries on the gold stan-
dard. Unlike most European countries, the US did not have the beneﬁto fa
central bank until 1913. This meant that when gold ﬂowed out of the country
7for whatever reason (as it did, for example, whenever the Bank of England
raised its discount rate), it drained reserves from private US banks and led
directly to contractions in domestic credit and money supply.5 In contrast,
European central banks often mitigated the adverse eﬀect of specie outﬂow
on domestic credit by drawing down oﬃcial gold reserves. In addition, the
US banking system operated under regulations that made it susceptible to
bank runs during periods of reserve scarcity. Thus, while the period between
1870 and 1913 is generally viewed as a stable one from the perspective of
the gold standard regime, it was less so from the perspective of US money
supply and credit.
The founding of the Fed in 1913 eliminated some of the problems that
plagued the US banking system. However, the period between the two world
wars was destined to be far more turbulent for the US than the period be-
tween 1870 and 1913. While the pre-WWI volatility in domestic monetary
and ﬁnancial conditions was the result of the interaction between a stable
gold standard regime and domestic monetary institutions, the instability of
the interwar years stemmed from the instability of the gold standard regime
itself. The war had raised domestic prices in most European countries and
h a dc a u s e dh y p e r i n ﬂation in Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Poland. Partly
in response to these adverse inﬂationary developments, there was a concerted
European attempt to resurrect the prewar gold standard. This meant that
European governments had to follow deﬂationary policies to lower their do-
mestic price levels to those that prevailed before the war. As a result, from
5See Calomiris and Hubbard (1989) for evidence on the role of disturbances to credit
availability in output ﬂuctuations during the pre-WWI era.
8about the middle 1920s, when most European countries had resumed convert-
ibility into gold, deﬂationary pressures strengthened in Europe. Predictably,
European unemployment rates rose and economic activity weakened. This
time, though, the political backlash against deﬂationary policies was severe.
As the depth of political opposition became increasingly clear, country af-
ter country fell victim to speculative attacks on their currencies and were
forced to suspend convertibility. Although the United States maintained
convertibility throughout this tumultuous period, the inability of key Euro-
pean countries to make the gold standard work was probably an important
contributing factor to the uncertainties that prevailed during the Great De-
pression.
Thus, for the US, the entire period from 1870 to the beginning of the
Second World War was characterized by monetary and ﬁnancial volatility.
This monetary volatility was charted by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) in
their celebrated book. The point of the brief discussion of the pre-WWI gold
standard regime, and the interwar attempt to resurrect it, is to emphasize
that pre-WWII macroeconomic policies were aimed primarily at maintaining
convertibility of the dollar rather than at domestic stability. This “overrid-
ing” objective of maintenance of a stable currency is the backdrop against
which the pre-WWII volatility in US monetary, ﬁnancial, and real activity
n e e d st ob ep l a c e d .
93 Environment
Our environment builds on work by Imrohoroglu (1989). The economy
evolves through good (g) and bad (b) times, which have implications for
employment prospects, earnings, and the prices at which agents purchase
commodities. The state of the economy n ∈ {g,b} is assumed to follow a










where, for example, Pr{nt+1 = g|nt = b} = λgb.
The economy consists of a large number of inﬁnitely lived agents who dif-







where 0 < β < 1 is their discount factor and ct is their consumption in period






where σ > 0.
Agents are endowed with one indivisible unit of time each period. Each
agent receives an employment opportunity that is independent across agents.
The employment opportunity has two states, i = e,u. If the employed state
occurs i = e, an agent produces yn units of the consumption good in state
10n. If the unemployed state occurs i = u, an agent produces θyn units of the
consumption good through household production in state n,w h e r e0 < θ < 1.
The individual-speciﬁc employment state is assumed to follow a ﬁrst order



















where, for example, Pr{it+1 = e|it = u,nt+1 = g} = λ
g
euis the probability
that an agent will be employed in good times at t +1 , given the agent was
unemployed in period t.
The overall employment prospects faced by each individual depends on
both the aggregate and individual states; that is, s = {n,i}. There are four
such states, where s1 stands for employed in a good state, s2 stands for
unemployed in a good state, s3 stands for employed in a bad state, and s4
stands for unemployed in a bad state. The process governing s is a ﬁrst-




,w h e r e
Pr{st+1 = sj | st = sk} = φjk. The transition probabilities are determined
by Λ and Λn. For example, if st = s1, then the probability of st+1 = s2, i.e.,
φ21, is given by λggλ
g
ue.
While event-contingent insurance is not permitted, agents can insure
themselves through holdings of money. Agents enter period t with indi-
vidual nominal money holdings Mt held over from the previous period. The
nominal price of consumption goods at time t in state n is given by Pn
t . Then
an agent’s budget constraint can be written:
11P
n




We assume that Pn
t =( 1+π)tPn so we can re-write the agent’s budget
constraint as:
c(st)=y(st) −
(mt+1(1 + π) − mt)
Pn ≥ 0
where mt = Mt(1 + π)−t. Finally, we require non-negativity of money hold-
ings.
The maximization problem faced by an individual in this economy can
be represented as a dynamic programming problem where the state variables
are m = mt and s = st, while the decision variable is m
0 = mt+1and the
future state variable is s
0 = st+1. The Bellman equation can be written:











(m0(1 + π) − m)
Pn ≥ 0,∀s (2)
Since agents face idiosyncratic shocks, they may hold diﬀerent levels of
money. Let µt(m,s) be the probability that an individual attains state (m,s)
in period t. Then, given the decision rule m0(m,s), the probability that










12where Ω(m0,s)={m : m0 = m0(m,s)}. Under mild regularity conditions
(ergodicity of the Markov process and the absence of cyclically moving sub-
sets), the sequence of recursively deﬁned distributions converges to a unique
invariant distribution µ(m,s) from any initial distribution.
4C a l i b r a t i o n
The calibration of this environment involves selecting parameter values for
two broad groups of variables: (i) aggregative variables, including the ag-
gregate state transition matrix Λ,t h ea v e r a g ei n ﬂation rate π, and the de-
trended price levels Pn, and (ii) the individual-level variables, including the
individual state transition matrix Λn, the individual-level real earnings y(s),
and the preference parameters β and σ.
A challenging aspect of this calibration is that we need to do it for both the
pre-and post-WWII eras. This means assembling long time series (stretching
back into the nineteenth century) on as many relevant variables as possible.
We succeeded in obtaining long time series on real GNP6,t h eC P I 7,a n d
real earnings8 going back to the late or mid-nineteenth century and on the
6The series for quarterly real GNP was assembled from the following sources: (i) for
1875.1 -1983.4 from the real GNP series reported in Table 2, Appendix B of Gordon (1986);
for 1984.1-1997.4 from NIPA.
7The series for annual CPI (‘all items’) was assembled by linking together the series
obtained from the following sources. For 1851-1880, from Table 1 p. 142 in Hoover (1960);
for 1881-1889 from Historical Statistics of the United States, Series E 135; for 1890-1914,
from Rees (1961), Table 22; for 1915-1970 from Historical Statistics of the United States,
Series E 135; for 1971-1997, BLS.
8The series on annual money earnings of nonfarm employees was assembled from the
13unemployment rate going back to 1900.9
The Aggregate State Transition Matrix
We used the time series on quarterly real GNP to determine the aggregate
state transition matrix. We began with the time series on the logarithm of
quarterly real GNP between 1875.1 and 1997.4 and extracted ﬂuctuations at
business cycle frequencies using the band-pass ﬁlter recommended by Baxter
and King (1995). Because the extraction distorts business cycle components
at the end points of a sample period, the recommended band-pass ﬁlter drops
three years of data at both the beginning and the end of the sample period.
We propose measuring the expected duration of “good” and “bad” times
in the pre- and post-WWII eras by classifying any quarter in which real
GNP was above trend as being a “good time” and any quarter in which it
was below trend as being a “bad time.” The average duration of good and
bad times in the two eras is taken as an estimate of the expected duration of
good and bad times in the two eras. In view of this, we eliminated the ﬁrst
six and the last two quarters of the detrended series because they belonged to
episodes of bad times whose beginning and ending dates, respectively, are not
following sources: (i) for 1860-1899: Historical Statistics of the United States, series D 735;
(ii) for 1900-1960: Lebergott (1964), Table A-17; (iii) for 1961-1963: Historical Statistics
of the United States, series D 722, scaled up by the average ratio (for 1955-1960) between
this series and Lebergott’s series; (iv) 1964-1997: calculated as the average hourly earnings
of nonfarm production workers multiplied by 52 x the average weekly hours worked by
nonfarm production workers (both series provided by the BLS). The resulting series was
adjusted by the annual CPI series to give the real earnings series.
9The series for the unemployment rate was assembled from the following sources: For
1900-1960 from Lebergott Table A-3 (the unemployment rate of nonfarm employees); for
1961-1997 from the BLS.
14known. We also wanted to maintain equal numbers of good and bad times
over the entire period so we terminated our sample at 1994.3, the quarter in
which the most recent episode of bad times ended.
Inspection of the de-trended series shows that the economic boom asso-
ciated with World War II began in the third quarter of 1941. Thus, we treat
the period 1879.3-1941.2 as belonging to the pre-WWII era and the period
1941.3-1994.3 as the post-WWII era. This gave us 19 episodes of good and
bad times in the pre-WWII era and 10 episodes of good and bad times in
the post-WWII era. The average duration of good and bad times for the
two eras, Dn,n= g,b, is reported in the top panel of Table 1. The average
duration of good times lengthened from 21.6 months in the pre-WWII era
to 30.5 months in the post-WWII period. Also, the average duration of bad
times lengthened from 19.6 months to 26.7 months.
The fact that the duration of spells of below-trend economic activity
lengthened during the post-WWII era may seem odd in light of the conven-
tional wisdom that the duration of contractionary spells (as dated by the
NBER) has fallen in the post-WWII era. Note, however, that the NBER’s
“expansion-contraction” classiﬁcation scheme is diﬀerent from ours in that an
NBER expansion begins in a trough and ends in a peak. Thus, it includes pe-
riods of both below-trend and above-trend economic activity. Furthermore,
the fact that both good and bad times have lasted longer in the post-WWII
era is consistent with evidence that ﬂuctuations in real GNP became more
persistent after WWII (see, for instance, DeLong and Summers (1988)).10
10There is also some uncertainty about the early reference dates in the NBER chronol-
ogy. The early reference dates were based upon de-trended data, whereas the reference
15From the information in the top panel of Table 1, the diagonal elements
of the aggregate state transition matrix for the two eras were computed
using the fact that λnn =1− 1/Dn,n= g,b. T h ef a c tt h a te a c hr o wo f
each transition matrix sums to 1 then determined the oﬀ-diagonal elements.
These matrices are displayed in the bottom panel of Table 1.
Table 1 - Aggregate Transition Parameters
Pre-WWII Post-WWII


















The De-trended Price Levels
We used annual time series on the CPI to determine the de-trended price
levels Pn. We began with the time series on the logarithm of the CPI from
1851 to 1997 and extracted its business cycle components using the recom-
mended band-pass ﬁlter for annual data. Once again, the recommended ﬁlter
drops three years of data at the beginning and the end of the sample period.
dates after 1927 are based on data in levels. According to Romer (1994), removing this
inconsistency makes the NBER reference cycles show a lengthening of the contractionary
spells between the pre-WWI and post-WWII eras as well. The average duration of a con-
tractionary spell goes from 9.7 months in the pre-WWI era to 10.9 in the post-WWII era.
Romer’s dates also indicate that the average duration of a cycle went from a little under
42 months in the pre-WWI period to a little over 62 months in the post-WWII period. If
we view consecutive episodes of good and bad times as a business “cycle,” our ﬁlter-based
classiﬁcation scheme also implies that the duration of the business cycle lengthened from
a little over 41 months in the pre-WWII era to a little over 57 months in the post-WWII
era.
16As a ﬁr s ts t e pt o w a r dd e t e r m i n i n gPn, we ran separate regressions of de-
trended CPI on annual de-trended real GNP (where annual de-trended real
G N Pw a sc r e a t e du s i n gt h es a m ep r o c e d u r ea st h a tf o rd e - t r e n d e dC P I )f o r
the pre- and post-WWII eras. Second, the coeﬃcient on real GNP (which
measures the elasticity of price with respect to output) was multiplied by
the average deviation from trend of real GNP in good and bad times in
the two eras. This led to the ﬁnding that, on average, the diﬀerence in de-
trended price levels between good and bad times was 1.68 percentage points
in the pre-WWII era but −0.65 percentage points in the post-WWII era.
Thus consumer prices were procyclical and more volatile in the pre-WWII
period, but countercyclical and much less volatile in the post-WWII period.11
Finally, the values of Pn,n= g,b, for each era was determined by setting the
unconditional expected value of the price level to 1 in both eras. For instance,
for the pre-WWII era, Pg and Pb are chosen to satisfy 1=λ
gPg +λ
bPb and
Pg − Pb =0 .0168, where λ
n denotes the unconditional probability of being
in state n = g,b. The resulting values of Pn are displayed in the top panel of
Table 2.
Table 2 - Price Data Parameters
Pre-WWII Post-WWII
Pg =1 .008,P b =0 .991 Pg =0 .997,P b =1 .004
π =0 .055% monthly π =0 .350% monthly
11The ﬁnding that the cyclical behavior of the (de-trended) price level changed between
the pre- and post-WWII era conﬁrms the earlier ﬁndings of Cooley and Ohanian (1991).
Cooley and Ohanian did not examine the CPI series used in this study, and they did not
use a band-pass ﬁlter to de-trend their series.
17The Inﬂation Rate
We used the average CPI inﬂation rate between 1851 and 1941 as the
average inﬂation rate for the pre-WWII era and the average CPI inﬂation
rate between 1942 and 1997 as the average inﬂation rate for the post-WWII
p e r i o d .A ta na n n u a lr a t e ,t h e s ei n ﬂation rates were 0.66 percent and 4.16
percent, respectively. These values are noted in the bottom panel of Table 2.
The Individual-Level State Transition Matrix
For each era, the individual-level state transition matrix is built up from
two pieces of information: the average unemployment rate in good and bad
times and the average duration of unemployment spells in good and bad
times.
The average unemployment rate in good and bad times in the pre-WWII
era was determined using a procedure similar to that for determining the
de-trended price levels in good and bad times. We regressed the annual un-
employment rate for the period 1900-1941 on a constant term and annual
de-trended real GNP. The estimate of the constant term, which came out to
be 10.65 percent, was taken to be a measure of the average unemployment
rate for the pre-WWII era. The estimated coeﬃcient on real GNP was multi-
plied by the diﬀerence in the average deviation from trend between good and
bad times in real GNP to give a measure of the diﬀerence in unemployment
rates between good and bad times in the pre-WWII era. The diﬀerence
was −7.16 percentage points. The unemployment rates in good and bad
times (denoted as Ug and Ub, respectively) were then determined by the re-
quirement that the unconditional unemployment rate in the pre-WWII era
equal 10.65 percent (i.e., by the requirement that 0.1065 = λ
gUg +λ
bUb and
18Ug − Ub = −0.0716). This implied an average unemployment rate of 7.24
percent in good times and 14.41 percent in bad times (Table 3).12
Table 3 - Unemployment Rates and Durations
Pre-WWII Post-WWII
Ug =0 .0724,Ub =0 .1441 Ug =0 .0515,Ub =0 .0678
Dg
u =2 ,D b
u =4months Dg
u =1 .44,D b
u =1 .96 months
There is no comprehensive source of information on the duration of un-
employment spells in the pre-WWII era. For the nineteenth century, the only
source (we are aware of) is Keyssar’s (1977) study of unemployment in Mas-
sachusetts. By the end of the nineteenth century, industrial unemployment
in Massachusetts (then America’s preeminent industrial state) had become
a big enough problem to attract the attention of state authorities. The com-
monwealth of Massachusetts conducted two censuses of unemployment, the
ﬁrst in 1885 and the second in 1890. The number unemployed in 1885 was
high (a depressed year) while that in 1890 was relatively low (a prosperous
year). Thus, the duration statistics from the two censuses give us some in-
dication of how the length of unemployment spells varied between bad and
good times in the late nineteenth century.
12Since these estimates are based on unemployment rates for 1900-1941, they are heav-
ily inﬂuenced by the Depression. Thus, it’s possible that our procedure exaggerates the
volatility of unemployment rates and their average value for the pre-WWII era. On the
other hand, the scattered evidence on late nineteenth century industrial unemployment
does suggest that the average unemployment rate during this period was quite high and
that the unemployment rate was very volatile (Lebergott (1964, Table A-15), Romer
(1986b, Table 9), and Keyssar (1977)).
19Table 4
Year Ending # of Males Unemp. for 1-3 m 4-6 m 7-12 m
May 01, 1885 178,628 42.5 47.0 10.5
May 31, 1890 136,374 57.1 32.8 10.1
Table 4 is adapted from Table II-5 in Keyssar (p.73). Taken at face value,
these ﬁgures suggest that more than half the unemployed workforce had been
without work for more than four months in the year ending in May 1, 1885
and more than half of the workforce was unemployed for less than three
months in the year ending May 31, 1890. However, for our purposes, the
use of these facts poses a problem. While the censuses recorded the duration
of unemployment spells, they did not distinguish between diﬀerent causes of
idleness. Keyssar suggests that there was a signiﬁcant seasonal component
to unemployment, which means that some spells of unemployment were pre-
dictable. Predictable spells of unemployment reduce average annual earnings
but do not entail any risk.
For the 1900-1941 period, data on unemployment duration were collected
in the 1910 and 1930 censuses and in a special census of unemployment
taken in 1931. The duration results from the 1910 census were tabulated in
1948 but not oﬃcially published. The 1930 census recorded both duration of
unemployment and reasons for idleness. Excluding workers who were unem-
ployed for seasonal reasons, the distribution of unemployed male workers by
w e e k so fu n e m p l o y m e n ti ss h o w ni nT a b l e5 .
20Table 5 - Duration of Unemployment, April 1930
Weeks of Unemployment <1 1-2 3-4 5-8 9-13 14-26 >27
Percent of Unemployed 2.64 13.07 13.13 15.22 14.81 26.13 15.00
Source: Table 2, p. 318, Unemployment, Vol II, Fifteenth Census of
the United States.
Thus, by early 1930, the average duration of unemployment exceeded 12.5
weeks, and more than 41 percent of workers had been unemployed for at least
14 weeks. The special census of unemployment undertaken in January 1931
was done for selected cities. The percentages of workers unemployed for at
least 18 weeks in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, and Los Angeles
were 45.3 percent, 60.9 percent, 45.2 percent, 61.0 percent, and 33.2 percent,
respectively.
On the basis of this scattered information on duration of unemployment
in the pre-WWII period, we tentatively set the average duration of unem-
ployment to four months in bad times and two months in good times for the
pre-WWII era.
Fixing the average duration of unemployment in good and bad times
allows us to pin down λ
g
uu as 1 −1/2 and λ
b
uu as 1 −1/4. T h ef a c tt h a te a c h





eu. Next, note that the evolution of the aggregate unemployment
rate is given by:
Ut = Ut−1λ
n(t)
uu +( 1− Ut−1)λ
n(t)
ue
where n(t) ∈ {g,b}. Since λ
n
uu etc. depend only on the current state, we may
expect Ut to converge to some constant if the state remains unchanged for
21some length of time. We choose λ
n









This choice implies that in our model the average unemployment rate in good
t i m e si ss o m e w h a tl a r g e rt h a nUg a n dt h ea v e r a g eu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t ei nb a d
times is somewhat less than Ub. However, since both the good and bad states
are highly persistent, these discrepancies are minor.
The Λn matrix for the post-WWII period was determined in a similar
way. Since we have quarterly data for this period, we regressed the quarterly
unemployment rate on a constant term and de-trended quarterly real GNP.
The constant term was estimated to be 5.91 percent and was taken as the
average unemployment rate in the post-WWII period. The coeﬃcient on real
GNP implied that the diﬀerence in the unemployment rate between good and
bad times is −1.63 percent. This implies unemployment rates of 5.15 percent
in good times and 6.78 percent in bad times.
There is comprehensive data on the median duration of unemployment
spells beginning in 1967. We regressed this series on a constant term and de-
trended quarterly real log GNP. The estimate of the constant term was 6.74
weeks and was taken as the average duration of unemployment in the post-
WWII period. The coeﬃcient on the logarithm of real GNP implies that the
diﬀerence in the duration of unemployment in good and bad times is −2.03
weeks. This implies a median duration of unemployment of 1.44 months in
good times and a median duration of unemployment of 1.96 months in bad
times. This information allows us to pin down λ
g
uu as 1 − 1/1.44 and λ
b
uu
as 1 − 1/1.96. The remaining elements of the Λn matrices were determined
22following the same procedure as for the pre-WWII case. These parameters
a r es u m m a r i z e di nT a b l e6 .





































To determine the earnings process for the two eras, we began with a
series on the average real annual earnings of nonfarm workers for the period
1860-1997. We took logarithms of the series and extracted its business cycle
component using the recommended band-pass ﬁlter for annual data. Again,
three years of data were dropped at each end of the sample.
To determine earnings in the employed state during good and bad times
in the pre-WWII era, we regressed de-trended real earnings on de-trended
annual real GNP for the period 1878-1941. The coeﬃcient on real GNP
(which measures the elasticity of real earnings with respect to real GNP)
when multiplied by the average diﬀerence between real GNP in good and
bad times implies a diﬀerence of 0.95 percent in real earnings between good
and bad times. A similar procedure for the post-WWII period (1942-1994)
revealed that the diﬀerence in real earnings between good and bad times
was 1.94 percent. Thus, real earnings were less volatile in the pre-WWII
as compared to the post-WWII era. This result is driven by the diﬀerent
behavior of de-trended prices in the two eras. Since prices were procyclical
23in the pre-WWII era, they partially countered the procyclical movement in
nominal earnings; no such oﬀset occurred in the post-WWII era. These
diﬀerences in earnings in good and bad times and the requirement that the
unconditional mean of earnings be 1 in both eras allowed us to pin down the
value of yn,n= g,b,for both eras. These values are noted in the top panel of
Table 7.
Table 7 - Earnings Parameters
Pre-WWII Post-WWII
yg =1 .0045,yb =0 .9950 yg =1 .0091,yb =0 .9897
θ =0 .25 θ =0 .25
Speciﬁcation of the earnings process also requires a value of the earnings
loss from unemployment. In the pre-WWII period there was no state un-
employment insurance. Furthermore, as documented by Keyssar, by 1875
industrial unemployment was an urban phenomenon. Workers who lost their
jobs did not have the option of returning to the countryside (many were im-
migrants from Europe). For some households, earnings of wives and children
provided some cushion against the loss of earnings of the primary breadwin-
ner. With these facts in mind, we tentatively assume that in the pre-WWII
era, the earnings of an unemployed worker was a quarter of that of an em-
ployed worker.
In the post-WWII era, all laid-oﬀ workers are eligible for unemployment
beneﬁts. However, our interest is not in the welfare eﬀects of unemployment
insurance per se, but on the eﬀects that such insurance may have had on the
stability of aggregate demand and, hence, on the aggregate unemployment
24rate and other macroeconomic variables.13 For this reason, we maintain the
same earnings loss from unemployment in the post-WWII era as in the pre-
WWII era.
Compound Transition Matrix
Given Λ and Λn, it is possible to construct Φ. This is given in Table 8.
Table 8: Compound Transition Matrices
Φpre =

       

0.9166 0.0373 0.0444 0.0018
0.4769 0.4769 0.0231 0.0231
0.0487 0.0021 0.9092 0.0399
0.0127 0.0381 0.2373 0.7119





       

0.8939 0.0733 0.0303 0.0025
0.6679 0.2993 0.0226 0.0101
0.0349 0.0025 0.8985 0.0641
0.0191 0.0183 0.4922 0.4704

       

Preference Parameters
Following Imrohoroglu, we set β =0 .9967 and σ =1 .5.
13The welfare eﬀects of unemployment insurance have been analyzed for this class of
models in Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992).
255 Findings
5.1 A Welfare Comparison of the Pre- and Post-WWII
Eras
We obtain decision rules for optimal money holdings by successive approx-
imations on the value function V (m,s). Following Imrohoroglu (1989), we
discretize the state space of money holdings to lie between 0 and 8.1 in in-
crements of 0.027 for a total of 301 grid points.14 The upper bound, again
the same as in Imrohoroglu, is roughly equal to eight months of income if
the employed state continues for that long. In equilibrium, this constraint
is never binding. We found that the sequence of decision rules typically
converged after 500 iterations.15 We denote the value function for the pre-
WWII stochastic processes for income and prices as Vpre(m,s) and that for
the post-WWII stochastic processes as Vpost(m,s).
We are interested in the welfare gain experienced by pre-WWII individu-
als from changes in the stochastic process for income and prices that occurred
during the post-WWII period. If the changes were improvements, we would
expect Vpost(m,s) to exceed Vpre(m,s). For an individual in state (m,s),t h e
improvement could be expressed in terms of consumption by computing γ
such that Vpre(m,s)=γ(m,s)1−σVpost(m,s). Then 1−γ(m,s) is the fraction
of consumption the individual can give up every period in an environment
14We also doubled the number of grid points and found no appreciable diﬀerences from
what is presented in the text.




26characterized by post-WWII stochastic processes without his utility falling
below that available to him in the pre-WWII environment. Denoting the
invariant measure for the pre-WWII environment by µpre(m,s) (this distri-
bution gives the unconditional probability of a worker’s having money m in
state s in the pre-WWII environment), the average gain in utility to pre-
WWII individuals is given by γ =
P
m,s µpre(m,s)γ(m,s).
Table 9 reports the key operating characteristics of the economy under
the pre- and post-WWII eras and the gain in welfare experienced by pre-
WWII individuals from the change in the stochastic process governing in-
come and prices. On average, pre-WWII individuals would be willing to give
up 4.19 percent of their consumption in perpetuity to live under the post-
WWII stochastic processes for income and prices. This substantial increase
in welfare is mirrored in the substantial changes in the stochastic process for
individual consumption. The average value of individual consumption (de-
noted
_
c) rises from 0.92 to 0.95 and the variance of consumption (denoted
v(c))d r o p sf r o m0.76 percent to 0.55 percent. Furthermore, the average
value of real money balances (denoted
_
m) falls from 3.74 to 1.52 and the
variance of real money holdings (denoted v(m))a l s od r o p sf r o m0.19 to 0.01.
Obviously, the decrease in risk of spells of unemployment cuts precautionary
saving.
Figures 1 and 2 compare the pre- and post-WWII value functions of an
employed and unemployed agent in a good aggregate state for this experi-
ment, respectively. Figures 3 and 4 contrast the pre- and post-WWII changes
in money holdings ( m0−m) of an employed and unemployed agent in a good
aggregate state for the same experiment, respectively. It is clear that when
27employed, agents who have low current holdings of money accumulate sav-
ings while those who have high current holdings decumulate. It should be
noted that beginning-of-period money balances for which an employed agent
chooses to switch from accumulation to decumulation are in the range of
six units for pre-WWII; they are in the range of two units for post-WWII.
When unemployed, however, an agent always decumulates if he has any sav-
ings. Finally, Figures 5 and 6 compare the pre- and post-WWII distributions
of money holdings for employed and unemployed agents in a good aggregate
state for this experiment, respectively. The major spikes in the distributions
arise where switching points from saving to dissaving occur.












PRE 3.7434 1.6162 0.91995 0.00758
POST 1.51555 0.19301 0.95059 0.00546
T a b l e9a l s or e p o r t st h ew e l f a r eg a i nb e t w e e nt h et w or e g i m e sf r o ma
“steady state” perspective. In this calculation (denoted by 1 − γss)w eﬁrst
determine γss(m,s) to satisfy Vpre(m,s)=γ1−σ
ss (m,s)V post, where V post =
P
m,s µpost(m,s)Vpost(m,s). In other words, we ask how much would pre-
WWII individuals be willing to give up to obtain the steady state welfare
associated with the post-WWII stochastic processes. Then γss,c a l c u l a t e d
as
P
m,s µpre(m,s)γss(m,s), is the fraction of consumption that pre-WWII
individuals would be willing to give up on average to obtain the steady state
utility associated with post-WWII stochastic processes. This measure of the
28welfare gain is 3.53 percent of individual consumption in perpetuity. Why
is 1 − γss lower than the 1 − γ ? The answer lies in the fact that the av-
erage money holdings of workers in the post-WWII regime is less than half
of the average money holdings of consumers in the pre-WWII regime: 3.74
months of income versus 1.52 months of income. Because unemployment
risk is a good deal lower in the post-WWII regime, workers hold less money
balances as a precaution against loss of income. As a result, the change in
stochastic processes allows pre-WWII individuals to decumulate money bal-
ances and enjoy a valuable consumption spree. When attention is focused
on the comparison of steady-state welfare, the gain in welfare accruing along
the transition path to the new steady state is not taken into account. For
this reason, 1 − γss is lower than the 1 − γ.
We should also note that operating characteristics of the pre-WWII regime
lends some support to our choice of earnings loss from unemployment. Re-
call that we set earnings when unemployed to a quarter of earnings when
employed (h =0 .25). This choice implied an average holdings of money bal-
ances of 3.74 months of income. According to Friedman and Schwartz (Table
A-5, p. 774), the US economy held, on average 2.67 months of (national)
income as balances in currency and checking accounts in 1915 (the midpoint,
roughly, of the pre-WWII era). Assuming that two-thirds of national income
accrues to labor, their ﬁndings imply that the economy held four months of
national labor income as balances. Since some portion of currency and check-
ing deposits were held by ﬁrms, these facts suggest that an average money
holding of 3.74 months for the pre-WWII era is reasonable.
295.2 Welfare Gains and the Role of Post-WWII Macroe-
conomic Policy Regime
We turn now to ﬁnding out how much of this increase in welfare can reason-
ably be ascribed to the change in the macroeconomic policy regime between
the two eras.
Welfare Eﬀects of Post-WWII Inﬂation
As noted earlier, most macroeconomists would agree that the macroeco-
nomic policy arrangement in the post-WWII era was an important cause of
higher inﬂation during the 1960s and 1970s. Thus, our ﬁrst (thought) ex-
periment is to ask: how much would a pre-WWII individual have to be paid
to live in a world that resembles the pre-WWII environment in all respects
e x c e p tt h a ti th a st h ep o s t - W W I Ii n ﬂation rate? The results are displayed
in Table 10. The loss in welfare of an increase in the annual inﬂation rate
from 0.66 percent to 4.16 percent is 0.99 percent of individual consumption
in perpetuity. As deadweight losses go, this is a fairly large reduction in
welfare. Note that the steady-state reduction in welfare is even larger, with
welfare being lower by 1.35 percent of consumption in perpetuity. Again,
the steady-state calculation gives a lower ﬁg u r eb e c a u s ei td o e sn o tt a k ei n t o
account the reduction in the average money holdings from 3.74 months of
income to 2.73 months of income












PRE 3.7434 1.6162 0.91995 0.00758
INF 2.73163 0.86645 0.91249 0.01049
The large reduction in welfare reﬂects the large increase in volatility of
individual consumption. Note that the variance of consumption rises from
0.76 percent in the pre-WWII era to 1.05 percent in this hypothetical world.
Furthermore, average consumption drops a small amount. The increase in
t h ev o l a t i l i t yo fc o n s u m p t i o ni sw h a tw ew o u l de x p e c t ,g i v e nt h ed r o pi n
precautionary money holdings. Of course, precautionary money holdings
drop because anticipated inﬂation discourages money holdings.16
Welfare Eﬀects of Changes in Cyclical Volatility
In this section we attempt to evaluate the potential welfare gains from re-
duction in cyclical volatility between the two eras. As noted earlier, the shift
in the focus of macroeconomic policies from external to domestic stability
probably reduced post-WWII cyclical volatility.
In this thought experiment we situate the worker in an environment in
which the mean unemployment rate and the mean inﬂation rate is identical
to that in the pre-WWII era, but the persistence of aggregate states, the
variance of the aggregate unemployment rate, and the cyclical behavior of
16Anticipated inﬂation also imposes costs stemming from distortion of the capital accu-
mulation decision and labor-leisure choice, which are not being taken into account here.
31prices and real earnings are those from the post-WWII period. In particular,
in this hypothetical world, Ug and Ub are 9.89 and 11.52 percent, respec-
tively (so that the mean unemployment rate is 10.65 p e r c e n t( t h es a m ea s
in the pre-WWII period) but the diﬀerence between good and bad states is
1.63 percentage points (that of the post-WWII period) ). These aggregate
unemployment rates in good and bad times were coupled with the “appro-
priate” Λg and Λb matrices. We used the observed relationship between the
probability of continuing in the unemployed state (or, equivalently, the du-
ration of unemployment spells) and aggregate unemployment rates to “back
out” the probability of continuing in the unemployed state for aggregate un-
employment rates of 9.89 and 11.52 percent. Our procedure implied that for
an aggregate unemployment rate of 9.89 percent, the probability of contin-
uing in the unemployed state is 0.5752 and for an aggregate unemployment
rate of 11.52 percent the probability of continuing in the unemployed state is
0.6439. The other elements of the individual-level transition matrices were de-
termined following the procedure described for pre-WWII (and post-WWII)
Λg and Λb matrices.
As noted in Table 11, pre-WWII individuals are willing to pay 0.13 per-
cent of individual consumption in perpetuity to live under these, less volatile,
income and price processes. When attention is conﬁned to steady states, the
individual worker is willing to give up 0.008 percent of consumption. The
negligible steady gain in welfare suggests that the 0.13 p e r c e n tg a i ni nw e l f a r e
is probably entirely due to the fact that the individuals held somewhat less
money balances in the new, less volatile steady state (3.41 months of income
as opposed to 3.74 months of income)















PRE 3.7434 1.6162 0.91995 0.00758
C 3.41443 1.37024 0.91844 0.00650
C1 3.73314 1.61286 0.91951 0.00779
C2 3.41526 1.37115 0.91847 0.00640
C3 3.73912 1.61239 0.92002 0.00782
These are strikingly small numbers. It appears, therefore, that the wel-
fare gains from the post-WWII reduction of business cycle volatility are quite
small. In particular, they are smaller than the welfare loss from higher post-
WWII inﬂation. The fundamental reason for these small welfare gains is that
individuals can self-insure eﬀectively by holding precautionary balances. As
a result, they do not put a high premium on reduction in volatility per
se. We ﬁnd this result of some signiﬁcance because of the ongoing contro-
versy about how volatile the pre-WWII era really was. In two inﬂuential
papers, Christina Romer (1986a,1986b) has argued that the high volatility
of pre-WWII data, in particular the pre-WWI data, is spurious and is caused
by biases in the construction of the data.17 Our ﬁnding suggests that the
17The data series we use include ones that Romer has criticized, in particular, the ones
for real GNP and the unemployment rate.
33resolution of this debate may have little consequence for the evaluation of
macroeconomic policies. The evaluation of macroeconomic policies must be
ultimately related back to the individuals they aﬀect. Even if the post-WWII
era was as volatile as the “oﬃcial” data series suggest, we cannot ignore the
possibility that pre-WWII individuals may have neutralized that volatility
by adapting to it in various ways. In the simple model analyzed here, the
adaptation takes the form of holding higher precautionary balances.
Table 11 also reports on the results of some additional thought experi-
ments designed to “parcel” out the (small) gain in welfare into that stemming
from an increase in persistence of aggregate states alone (C1), from a reduc-
tion in the variance of aggregate unemployment alone (C2), and from the
cyclical change in the behavior of the price level and real earnings alone
(C3). As these results show, the eﬀects of the change in persistence and the
changes in the cyclical behavior of prices and earnings are very small (and,
in fact, negative). The bulk of the 0.13 percent gain in welfare comes from
the reduction in the volatility of the aggregate unemployment rate. Again,
we ﬁnd this result informative because some economists have argued that
a key consequence of postwar stabilization policies has been a reduction in
transitory ﬂuctuations in economic activity and, hence, an increase in the per-
sistence of ﬂuctuations in real GNP (DeLong and Summers (1988)). While
that may be so, our thought experiment shows that the change in persistence
itself had negligible welfare eﬀects.
Welfare Eﬀects of Changes in Mean Unemployment Rate
Our ﬁnal thought experiment is to situate the pre-WWII worker in an
environment in which the inﬂation rate, the variance of the aggregate unem-
34ployment rate, the persistence of aggregate states, and the cyclical behavior
or the price level and real earnings are the same as in the pre-WWII era
but the mean unemployment rate is the same as in the post-WWII era. In
particular, in this hypothetical world Ug and Ub are 2.57 and 9.73 percent,
respectively (so that the mean unemployment rate is 5.91 percent (that of the
post-WWII era) but the diﬀerence between good and bad states is 7.16 per-
centage points (that of the pre-WWII era)). These aggregate unemployment
rates were “matched up” with probability of continuing in the unemployed
state of 0.2657 and 0.5683, respectively.
As shown in Table 12, the pre-WWII individual would be willing to give
up 4.61 percent of consumption in perpetuity to live under these stochastic
processes for income and prices. Comparing steady states, the gain in welfare
is 4.15 percent of consumption. In this case, the increase in welfare is reﬂected
in changes in all three important operating characteristics of the hypothetical
economy: the average level of money balances drops from 3.74 months of
income to 2.23 months of income; the mean level of consumption rises from
0.92 to 0.96; and the volatility of consumption falls from 0.76 percent to 0.47
percent. All these changes reﬂect the substantial reduction in unemployment
risks compared to the pre-WWII environment.













PRE 3.7434 1.6162 0.91995 0.00758
UN 2.22620 0.40409 0.95551 0.00471
Thus, the overall gain in welfare of 4.19 percent between the pre- and post-
WWII eras stems mostly from a reduction in the mean unemployment rate.18
Thus, the validity of the proposition that post-WWII policy regime improved
welfare rests on these policies’ having lowered the average unemployment
rate. Again, this is informative in that macroeconomists haven’t directed
any attention to understanding why the average unemployment rate fell so
much between the pre- and post-WWII eras. Our ﬁndings suggest that it is
important to ﬁnd out how much of the decline in the unemployment rate can
be attributed to macroeconomic policies.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
We computed the potential economic beneﬁts that would accrue to a typical
pre-WWII era US worker from the post-WWII macroeconomic policy regime.
18A sum of the welfare gains (and losses) from changes in the inﬂation rate, cyclical
volatility, and mean unemployment rate is 3.58 percent. The discrepancy between this
sum and the overall gain in welfare of 4.19 percent reﬂects the fact that post-WWII
inﬂation has less of an adverse eﬀect on welfare when unemployment risk is at the lower
post-WWII level rather than the higher pre-WWII level.
36We assumed that workers face undiversiﬁable income risk but can self-insure
by saving in nominal assets. The worker’s average utility is computed for
two eras: pre-WWII (1875-1941) and post-WWII. In the pre-WWII era,
the worker endured business cycles that were large in amplitude and quite
volatile, a procyclical aggregate price level with large cyclical amplitude, a
high average unemployment rate, and virtually no trend in the aggregate
price level. In the post-WWII era, the same worker would have encountered
business cycles with smaller amplitude and less volatility, a countercycli-
cal aggregate price level with small cyclical amplitude, a much lower mean
unemployment rate, and a positive trend in the aggregate price level. We
ﬁnd that a pre-WWII individual would be willing to pay 4.19 percent of his
consumption in perpetuity to live under the post-WWII business cycle en-
vironment. Most macroeconomists would agree that the higher post-WWII
inﬂation was a consequence of the post-WWII macroeconomic policy regime.
By itself, the higher inﬂation reduced welfare by 0.9 percent of consump-
tion (in perpetuity). There is much more controversy about how post-WWII
macroeconomic policies aﬀected the mean and variance of aggregate unem-
ployment. Depending on what is assumed about the eﬀects of post-WWII
macroeconomic policies on the mean and variance of the aggregate unem-
ployment rate, the potential gain in the worker’s welfare from post-WWII
macroeconomic policies could range between −0.9 percent of consumption
(no eﬀect of macroeconomic policies on mean and variance of aggregate un-
employment) to 4.19 percent of consumption (macroeconomic policies were
largely responsible for the decline in the mean and variance of aggregate
unemployment).
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−3 Fig.6: Distributions of Money Holdings of those Unemployed in Good State
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